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Introduction 
The past three years have witnessed a record 
decline in the exchange value of the U.S. dollar. 
This depreciation generally has been consistent 
with market fundamentals, such as the U.S. 
current-account deficit, movements in interest- 
rate spreads, changes in relative inflation rates, 
and divergent money-growth rates. A sharp 
increase in central-bank intervention, especially 
by the United States, also has accompanied the 
dollar's depreciation. 
Many observers believe that this intervention 
contributed to the dollar's decline in 1985 and 
that it helped to stabilize the dollar in 1987. 
Indeed, at first glance, it might appear that the 
massive intervention of late 1985 pushed the 
dollar downward and that the heavy intervention 
in early 1987 helped to stabilize the dollar. As 
Copemicus demonstrated long ago, however, 
first glances can deceive. 
This article takes a second look at our recent 
experiences, and asks if day-to-day intervention 
was related to day-to-day movements in dollar 
exchange rates. We find no  systematic relation- 
ship, but we identify a few specific occasions 
when U.S.  intervention seemed to alter exchange 
mtes. Our review of circumstances surrounding 
these episodes suggests that intervention can 
produce a one-time shift in exchange rates by 
providing new information to the market about 
monetary and fiscal policies or about official atti- 
tudes concerning the dollar. 
Section I of the paper provides background 
information about the theoretical channels 
through which intervention might alter exchange 
rates. Section I1 discusses the empirical method- 
ology. We use regression techniques that distin- 
guish between "initial" and "subsequent" inter- 
vention in our search for systematic relationships 
between intervention and exchange-rate move- 
ments. Section I11 analyzes U.S. intervention from 
August 1984 to August 1987. A case study of spe- 
cific episodes of intervention supplements the 
statistical analysis, and we present three subsec- 
tions that correspond to three different U.S. 
approaches to intervention during this period. 
Section IV summarizes the results and offers 
some policy conclusions. 
I.  Intervention and 
Exchange  Rates 
Exchange-market intervention refers to official 
purchases or sales of currencies designed to 
influence exchange rates. These transactions 
alter the net foreign-currency position of the 
monetary authorities' balance sheet. Economic 
theory offers three possible channels through 
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monetary channel, the portfolio-adjustment 
channel, and the expectations channel.' 
The most understood and accepted of these is 
the monetary channel. Intervention can alter the 
money supplies of both countries whose curren- 
cies are involved in the transactions. Other 
things equal, intervention will contract the 
money supply of the currency that is purchased 
and will expand the money supply of the cur- 
rency that is sold. Economists generally agree 
that relative rates of money growth exert a strong 
influence on exchange rates. Such intervention 
will tend to depreciate the currency that is sold 
relative to the currency that is purchased. 
Since the inception of floating exchange rates 
in 1973, major countries routinely have "steril- 
ized," or offset, the monetary effects of their 
exchange-market intervention through transac- 
tions with other, more conventional instruments 
of monetary policy. For example, if  the Federal 
Reserve wishes to prevent an intervention pur- 
chase of West German marks from increasing the 
U.S. money supply, it can sell an equivalent dol- 
lar amount of Treasury bills through open- 
market operations. The sale of Treasury bills 
reduces the U.S. money supply. Countries steril- 
ize intervention because they wish to focus their 
monetary policies on domestic objectives, such 
as inflation or growth, and because they believe 
that they can conduct independent intervention 
and monetary policies. 
One cannot easily distinguish sterilized inter- 
vention from nonsterilized intervention. To ster- 
ilize intervention, the offset need not be dollar- 
for-dollar.  A central bank need only prevent 
intervention from altering the amount of reserves 
in its banking system from their target level. 
Since exchange-rate considerations can influence 
monetary policy decisions, the very idea of an 
independent, sterilized intervention sometimes 
becomes fuzzy. 
The second channel through which interven- 
tion can influence exchange rates, the portfolio- 
adjustment channel, is open to sterilized inter- 
vention. Although it does not change relative rates 
of money growth, sterilized intervention alters the 
supply of bonds denominated in one currency 
relative to the supply of bonds denominated in 
another currency. In our example, the Federal Re- 
serve sold Treasury bills to sterilize its interven- 
B  1  Humpage (1986)  discusses these channels and reviews some  important 
empirical literature. 
tion transactions and thereby increased the rela- 
tive supply of U.S. Treasury bills in the market. 
If international investors view securities with 
different currency denominations as imperfect 
substitutes, then the increase in Treasury bills 
could cause a portfolio diversification away from 
dollar-denominated assets. Interest rates would 
rise and the dollar would depreciate until inter- 
national investors felt compensated for the risks 
of holding the now more abundant dollar- 
denominated assets. Although portfolio adjust- 
ment then provides a possible link between ster- 
ilized intervention and the spot exchange rate, 
empirical evidence suggests that it is at best a 
very weak link (see Hutchison, 1984). 
Both sterilized and nonsterilized intervention 
can also influence exchange rates through a third 
channel, by altering expectations in the 
exchange market. The exchange market, like 
other financial-asset markets, is a highly efficient 
information processor.2 Currency traders use all 
available information, including information 
about predictable future events and anticipated 
policies, in establishing current exchange quotes. 
An empirical implication of market efficiency 
is that exchange rates will follow a "fair game":3 
St+ I  -  - s1  +  E(As,  11,)  +  a,. 
The spot exchange rate tomorrow, S,  + ,, will 
equal today's spot rate, St,  plus any expected 
change, E (AS,  1 I,), given all information, I,, 
available today plus a random component a,  that  , 
reflects unanticipated events, or "news." Empiri- 
cal research often has found that log changes in 
exchange rates follow fair-game processes, 
specifically  a random-walk process, where 
E (AS,  I  I,) =  0,  or a near random-walk process, 
where E (AS,  I I,)  = a ~onstant.~ 
Intervention, to the extent that it improves the 
flow of information in a "disorderly" market, or 
to the extent that it provides new information 
about future policies, can alter current exchange 
rates. One would expect a one-time permanent 
shift in the exchange rate when the new infor- 
mation is received. If, however, the intervention 
provided no new information about pending 
changes in policy or in official attitudes about 
exchange markets, it would have no impact in an 
efficient market. 
W  2 See Fama (1970) 
3  Fw  a discussion of  Ihe relationship between efficiency, "fair games," 
and random walks, see Levich (1985). 
4  See  Meese and  Rogoff (1983) 
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service. Intervention dummies are constructed from internal documents on U.S. intervention. 
Because the exchange quotes are morning quotes on day "t," and because intervention pertains to purchases 
or sales throughout day "t," we lag intervention one period to ensure that the exchange-rate movements follow 
intervention. 
Each equation is estimated from approximately one month before the first intervention transaction to 
approximately one month after the last intervention transaction. We indicate the exact dates on each table. 
Equation 
We  estimate the following equation in all cases, but we omit certain dummies when they are not relevant to a 
particular episode: 
DM/$  =  BDA  (-1)  + BDB (-1)  + SDA  (-1)  +  SDB (-1)  +  DM/$  (-1) 
and 
Y/$  =  BYA(-1) +  BYB(-1) +  SYA(-1) +  SYB(-I) +  Y/$(-1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
DM/$  = the log of the West German mark-U.S. dollar exchange rate; 
Y/$  =  the log of the  Japanese yen-U.S. dollar exchange rate; 
BDA  =  initial intervention purchases of West German marks; 
BDB  = subsequent intervention purchases of West German marks; 
SDA  =  initial intervention sales of West German marks; 
SDB  =  subsequent intervention sales of West German marks; 
BYA  =  initial intervention purchases of Japanese yen; 
BYB  = subsequent intervention purchases of Japanese yen; 
SYA  =  initial intervention sales of Japanese yen; 
SYB  = subsequent intervention sales of Japanese yen; 
and where (-1) indicates a one-period lag. 
The dummy variables for initial intervention take a value of 1 when the United States intervened after five 
previous business days during which no intervention took place, and the variables take a value of 0 at all other 
times. The dummy variables for subsequent intervention take a value of 1 when the United States has intervened 
within the previous five business days. This dummy is set equal to 0 at all other times. Each table lists the 
number of times per episode that each dummy takes a value of 1. 
II.  Empirical  Methodology 
This paper uses an empirical methodology con- 
sistent with the efficient market view of 
exchange rates. Over each period of interven- 
tion, we regressed the log of the spot mark- 
dollar and/or yen-dollar exchange rate on its 
previous day's value and on two sets of dummy 
variables, corresponding to types of U.S. inter- 
vention (see box 1). One set of dummies meas- 
ures "initial" U.S. intervention purchases or sales 
of dollars, and a second set measures "subse- 
quent" U.S. intervention. 
We distinguish between initial and subse- 
quent intervention because the former could 
have an announcement effect that is not asso- 
ciated with the latter. We arbitrarily define initial 
intervention as an official transaction that follows 
a period of five business days with no interven- 
tion. The remaining transactions are classified as 
subsequent intervention. We do not include 
dummies for foreign intervention. 
The coefficients associated with the dummy 
variables measure the average percentage 
change in the exchange rate on days of initial 
and subsequent intervention over each interven- 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 2
Best available copytion episode. If  the coefficient on the interven- 
tion dummy is significantly different from zero, it 
suggests that intervention provided new informa- 
tion to the market that was not contained in the 
previous day's quote. 
In splitting the dummy variables, we test to 
see if the information content of initial interven- 
tion is different from that of subsequent inter- 
vention. In all cases except one, the average dol- 
lar value of initial intervention was not greater 
than the average daily amount of subsequent 
intervention. Nevertheless, the "news" content of 
initial intervention could be substantially greater. 
The coefficients on the dummy variables should 
reflect differences in the news content and not 
dollar amounts. 
We adopted this regression technique as a 
means of summarizing the day-to-day exchange- 
rate response to intervention. We consider five 
distinct time periods, rather than running a single 
regression over the entire period, to avoid having 
the coefficients on the dummy variables average 
the responses to different circumstances. Neverthe- 
less, such regressions, even over very short time 
periods, risk this problem, as will shortly be- 
come apparent. Consequently, we also base our 
conclusions on a day-to-day inspection of events 
surrounding each episode of U.S. intervention.5 
Ill.  Three Case Studies of 
Intervention: August  1984 
to  August  1987 
Between August 1984 and August 1987, the United 
States seemed to adopt three different approaches 
to exchange-market intervention. Prior to the 
Group of Five (G5) meeting in September 1985, 
the U.S. approach to intervention seemed to be a 
continuation of the policy established in March 
1981.6  This approach viewed intervention as 
appropriate only on relatively few occasions to 
"calm disorderly markets." From August 1984 to 
the G5 meeting in September 1985, the United 
States intervened on two occasions, each of 
which was short in duration. U.S. intervention 
prior to the G5 agreement often was not closely 
coordinated with that of other central banks and 
w  5  Three other case  studies of  intervention are by Greene:  (1984a), 
(1984b), and (1984~). 
6  The  Group of Five industrial countries are France, West Germany, 
Japan, Ihe Uniled Kingdom, and the United States. 
often was not highly visible. The total dollar 
value of U.S. intervention over this period was 
$938 million. 
U.S. intervention immediately following the 
G5 meeting departed from this earlier approach 
by encouraging a dollar depreciation through 
large, persistent dollar sales against West German 
marks and Japanese yen. This intervention, 
which amounted to approximately $3.2 billion, 
was more closely coordinated with that of other 
central banks and was very visible. The G5 epi- 
sode of intervention lasted through November 
1985; thereafter the United States did not inter- 
vene until early 1987. 
A third intervention regime followed the 
Group of Seven (G7) meeting in February 
1987.'  In most respects the G7 approach to 
intervention was not much different from the G5 
approach, except that central banks now aimed 
at stabilizing the dollar rather than promoting a 
further dollar depreciation. Rumors following the 
meeting suggested that the G7 countries were 
attempting to maintain reference zones for the 
mark-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates. The 
United States intervened on two occasions fol- 
lowing the G7 meeting, with gross intervention 
(purchases plus sales) over both periods 
exceeding $4.0 billion. The first lasted from 
March to  June 1987, and the second occurred in 
August 1987. 
In sum, the three-year period between August 
1984 and August 1987 provides us with five 
examples of U.S. intervention within three broad 
U.S. intervention regimes. Two episodes 
occurred prior to the G5 meeting, one imme- 
diately followed the G5 meeting, and two fol- 
lowed the G7 meeting. 
Intervention Prior to the 
Group of  Five  Meeting 
By  late 1984, the dollar increasingly seemed 
overvalued in terms of purchasing power parity 
or trade considerations. The growing U.S. 
current-account deficit reached a record $30 bil- 
lion in the fourth quarter, bringing the deficit for 
all of 1984 to $106.0 billion, up sharply from 
$46.6 billion in the previous year. 
The Federal Reserve System began to inject 
reserves into the banking system, as evidenced 
by a sharp reduction in the federal funds rate 
late in the year. The average effective federal 
7  The  Group of  Seven industrial countries are Ihe 65 countries plus Can- 
ada and Italy. 
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Dependent Variable: mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (3)  -0.008  -1.51Ba 
Subsequent purchases  (2)  0.002  0.342 
Initial sales  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent sales  (0)  -  - 
Lagged dependent  1.000  1001.5~ 
Sum of Squared Residuals =  0.006 
R2  =  0.893 
n  = 74 
11. Estimation Period:  December 21, 1984 to April 9,  1985 
Dependent Variable: mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (3)  0.004  0.776 
Subsequent purchases  (4)  0.005  1.183 
Initial sales  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent sales  (0)  - 
Lagged dependent  0.999  1067.4~ 
Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.005 
R2  =  0.920 
n  = 69 
NOTE:  Intervention refers to U.S. purchases or sales of foreign currencies. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times the dummy equals 1. 
a. Significant at the 10% confidence level, using a one-tail test. 
b.  Significant at the 1%  confidence level. 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
funds rate dropped from 11.6 percent in August 
to 8.4 percent in December. The Federal Reserve 
also cut its discount rate on two occasions, bring- 
ing it down to 8 percent from 9 percent. Slower 
economic activity and an easier monetary policy 
stance resulted in reduced U.S. long-term and 
short-term interest rates relative to similar rates 
in West Germany and Japan. Both long-term and 
short-term interest-rate spreads began to narrow 
in favor of a dollar depreciation. 
Nevertheless, the dollar did not immediately 
depreciate. Strong inflows of foreign private sav- 
ings continued to support the dollar, and real 
and nominal U.S. interest rates remained high 
relative to rates in West Germany and Japan. 
Many observers believed that further reduc- 
tions in interest-rate differentials were unlikely 
and that U.S. interest rates could rise again, pri- 
marily because of the prospects for continued 
large U.S. budget deficits. Many economists also 
believed that foreign central banks, especially in 
Europe, would lower interest rates along with 
the declines in U.S. interest rates to offset any 
appreciation of their currency against the dollar 
and to spur real growth in their economies. 
The first episode of U.S. intervention, in Sep- 
tember and October 1984, involved sporadic 
sales of dollars. In September 1984, as the dollar 
rose above 3 Deutsche marks (DM) for the first 
time, the Bundesbank aggressively sold dollars 
in the foreign-exchange market. Dollar sales by 
the Bundesbank amounted to DM  6.1 billion.8 
Some other large central banks also sold dollars, 
but Japan rarely intervened during this peri~d.~ 
The United States intervened three times in Sep- 
tember 1984 and twice in October 1984, buying 
a moderate $279 million worth of DM  (Cross, 
Spring 1985, p. 60). 
The regression equations for this episode sug- 
gest that intervention influenced the mark-dollar 
exchange rate. The coefficient associated with 
the dummy variable for initial U.S. purchases of 
marks is statistically significant and correctly 
signed (see table 1). This coefficient suggests 
that, on average, initial intervention contributed 
to a 0.8 percent depreciation of the dollar. 
An inspection of the day-to-day pattern, how- 
ever, suggests that all of this influence reflects 
activity on a single day (September 24) when 
U.S. intervention followed very large, highly vis- 
ible West German purchases of dollars (see fig- 
ure 1). Outside of this one day, the dollar did 
not depreciate following initial intervention. 
The coefficient associated with subsequent 
U.S. intervention, of which there was little, was 
not statistically significant. Subsequent interven- 
tion seemed to have no effect on exchange-rate 
movements. On balance, the dollar appreciated 
during this period. 
8  West German data are changes in foreign-exchange reserves. Changes 
in foreign-exchange reserves are only a proxy for intervention because they are 
influenced by various commercial transactions, by the receipt of "troop dollars" 
in West Germany, and by the receipt of interest earnings on these reserves 
and currency valuations. Nevertheless, one can infer the general magnitude of 
intervention from sharp changes in foreign-currency holdings at times when 
intervention is known to have occurred. Data on West  German intervention 
versus dollars is from "Reporl of  the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1984," 
pp. 66-67. 
9  See Cross (Spring 1985). 
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SOURCES:  Bank  of  America,  DRI-FACS;  and  Federal  Resenre  Bank  of 
Cleveland. 
Jan.  Feb.  March 
1985 
SOURCES:  Bank  of  America,  DRI-FACS;  and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland. 
10  See Cross: (Spring 1985), (Summer  1985), and (Autumn 1985). 
w  11  See  "Reporl of the  Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1984," pp.  66- 
67; and "Monthly  Report of  the  Deulsche Bundesbank." vol. 37, no.  4. 
The second episode of U.S. intervention began 
in late January 1985 and continued through early 
March. Preceded by rumors of massive interven- 
tion and possible capital controls in West Ger- 
many and Japan, central-bank intervention in- 
creased sharply in January 1985. The volume of 
intervention from January through March was the 
heaviest since the floating-exchange-rate period 
began. Between late January and early March, the 
United States sold $6  59 million, and the other 
large central banks collectively sold approximate- 
ly $10 billion.10 Dollar sales by the West German 
Bundesbank amounted to nearly DM  13 billion, 
or approximately $4 billion, in the first quarter of 
1985.11 The Japanese also entered the market. 
During this period, the United States inter- 
vened intermittently. On two occasions in late 
January, the United States bought $94 million 
worth of marks (Cross, Spring 1985, p. 60). On 
three occasions in the first three weeks of Febru- 
ary, the Federal Reserve System bought $242.6 
million worth of marks, $48.8 million of yen, and 
$16.4 million equivalent in British pounds 
(Cross, Autumn 1985, p. 58). In the last week of 
February and the first week of March, central- 
bank intervention was very heavy and included 
U.S. purchases of $257.6 million equivalent in 
marks (Cross, Autumn 1985, p. 58). 
As summarized in our regression equations, 
U.S. intervention over this time frame had no 
perceptible impact on the day-to-day movements 
in the mark-dollar exchange rate (see table 1). 
Neither the coefficient on the dummy variable 
for initial intervention nor the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for subsequent intervention was 
statistically different from zero at standard confi- 
dence intervals. 
These results, however, mask events on Feb- 
ruary 27. Prior to this episode, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker indicated in a statement 
to the House Banking Committee that interven- 
tion in January and early February had not been 
sufficient to influence exchange rates. He 
seemed to suggest that a larger volume of inter- 
vention was necessary on those occasions when 
central banks intervened. 
European central banks began intervening 
heavily on February 27, and the United States 
began intervening when the New York market 
opened. The opening mark-dollar quote was 3.5 
percent lower than the previous day's opening 
quote (see figure 2). The dollar began appreciat- 
ing on February 28, reversing much of the depre- 
ciation over the next week. Thereafter, however, 
the dollar began a sustained depreciation against 
the West German mark and the Japanese yen. 
In both of these pre-G5 intervention episodes, 
U.S. intervention did not have a systematic 
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December  1985 
Sept.  Oct.  Nov. 
1985 
SOURCES:  Bank  of  America,  DRI-FACS;  and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland. 
impact on day-to-day exchange-rate movements. 
Unlike foreign intervention, U.S. intervention was 
not very visible, nor was it closely coordinated 
with foreign intervention during this period. For 
the two occasions on which we note an appro- 
priate change in the exchange rate, the response 
seems to be a reaction to foreign intervention 
and/or to remarks of the Federal Reserve Chair- 
man rather than to U.S. intervention. 
U.S. intervention over this period did not 
seem to represent a departure from previous U.S. 
intervention policy and did not signal a change 
in U.S. monetary or fiscal policies. Despite his 
comments about the volume of intervention, 
Chairman Volcker had reiterated his view that 
intervention by itself was of limited usefulness in 
affecting exchange rates, and the U.S. Treasury 
did not seem to favor increased intervention. 
From mid-March 1985 through late August 
1985, as the dollar depreciated against all of the 
major currencies, central banks generally did not 
intervene in the foreign-exchange market to 
influence the dollar's exchange value. Most for- 
eign central banks bought dollars fairly steadily 
in moderate amounts to bolster foreign reserves. 
The United States, West Germany, and Japan did 
not enter the market during this period.12 
12  See Cross (Autumn 1985); and "Repart of  the Deutsche Bundesbank 
for  the Year 1985." 
Economic developments continued to favor a dol- 
lar depreciation, especially during the first half of 
1985. Interest rates continued to decline in the 
United States, but European central banks 
initially did not follow suit. International interest- 
rate spreads narrowed and promoted a dollar 
depreciation. 
By  mid-year, however, the exchange market 
seemed to become uncertain about the short- 
term prospects for further dollar depreciation. As 
economic growth abroad began to weaken, for- 
eign central banks eased monetary policy through 
an injection of reserves and reductions in official 
interest rates. Interest-rate spreads began to  flatten 
and reverse themselves. In addition, U.S. money 
growth (MI) remained well above target, suggest- 
ing that at some point the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem might tighten policy, and Chairman Volcker 
began to warn about the dangers of a too-rapid 
decline in the dollar. In late August and early 
September 1985, the dollar began to strengthen 
against the mark as expectations began to  change. 
The finance ministers of the G5 nations met in 
New York over the weekend of September 22 to 
discuss policies to resolve the huge international 
trade imbalances. The communique issued at 
the meeting suggested closer cooperation 
among the participants and listed a number of 
policies that individual countries would under- 
take to help correct existing trade imbalances. 
The communique also reaffirmed the partici- 
pants' support for exchange-market intervention. 
Immediately following the G5 meeting, the 
dollar fell sharply as news of the communique 
circulated. On Monday morning, September 23, 
the dollar had fallen 5.0 percent against the mark 
and 4.6 percent against the yen since the pre- 
vious Friday (see figure 3). West Germany began 
intervening on Monday as trade opened. This 
was the first German intervention since March, 
and it confirmed expectations about interven- 
tion. The United States began intervening on 
Monday against the yen. With the Japanese 
market closed on the Monday following the G5 
meeting, the Japanese began intervening on 
Tuesday (see Cross, Winter 1985-86).  Combined 
dollar sales for the first three days of the G5 
intervention were very heavy. 
The dollar depreciated sharply against both the 
mark (8.7 percent) and the yen (12.1 percent) 
until October 4. The United States sold a total of 
$199 million against the West German mark and 
$262 million against the Japanese yen during the 
last week of September and the first week of 
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published foreign-exchange reserves dropped by 
nearly $1 billion during September (Cross, Win- 
ter 1985-86,  p. 48). West Germany's foreign- 
exchange reserves declined DM  664 million in 
September and DM  2.0 billion in October (Bun- 
desbank, 1985). As the dollar began to firm again 
after October 4, the United States intensified its 
intervention efforts, selling nearly $1.6 billion 
against marks and $617.6 million against yen 
during the middle two weeks of October (Cross, 
Winter 1985-86,  p. 47). 
After the week of November 20, all three coun- 
tries ceased intervention. During the entire G5 
episode, the United States sold $3.2 billion 
against the mark and yen. The other G5 nations 
I.  Estimation Period: August 23, 1985 to December 9, 1985 
A.  Dependent Variable: mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchasesa  (1)  -0.052  -6.455b 
Subsequent purchases  (13)  0.002  0.824 
Initial sales  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent sales  (0)  -  - 
Lagged dependent  0.999  1003.3~ 
Sum of Squared Residuals =  0.00427 
R2  =  0.970 
n  = 75 
B.  Dependent Variable: yen-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchasesa  (2)  -0.027  -4.996b 
Subsequent purchases  (17)  -0.0002  -0.101 
Initial sales  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent sales  (0)  -  - 
lagged dependent  0.999  5272.1 
Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.00421 
R2  = 0.987 
n = 75 
NOTE: Intervention refers to U.S. purchases or sales of foreign currencies. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times the dummy equals 1. 
a.  No lag on dummy. 
b. Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
sold approximately $5 billion, and the other large 
industrial countries sold approximately $2 billion. 
Despite the difference in the approach to 
intervention over this period, the regression 
results are strikingly similar to those in the pre- 
G5 intervention regime (see table 2A). The G5 
results suggest that the primary influence of 
intervention on the mark-dollar and the yen- 
dollar exchange rates came through the 
announcement effect of the G5 communique. 
Subsequent intervention was largely ineffectual. 
In the regression for the mark-dollar exchange 
rate, the coefficient for initial intervention is not 
statistically significant at acceptable confidence 
intervals, unless the lag on the dummy variable 
is removed. When the lag is removed, the coeffi- 
cient is highly significant and suggests that the 
G5 announcement resulted in an immediate 5 
percent depreciation of the mark-dollar 
exchange rate. With the lag removed, the 
dummy variable captures the announcement of 
the G5 intentions and foreign and U.S. interven- 
tion in the Far Eastern and European markets 
that occurred on Monday, September 22, prior to 
the opening of the New York market. 
As in the previous episodes, the coefficient on 
the variable for subsequent U.S. intervention pur- 
chases of marks was not statistically significant at 
conventional confidence intervals, nor does it 
have the expected sign. Unlike the previous epi- 
sodes, intervention was more persistent through- 
out the September 22 to November 20 period. 
We obtain similar results in the equation for 
the yen-dollar exchange rate. When the dummy 
variable for initial intervention is lagged, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at accept- 
able confidence intervals. When the dummy var- 
iable is not lagged, the coefficient is highly sig- 
nificant and indicates that the initial intervention 
resulted in an average 2.7 percent depreciation 
of the dollar relative to the yen. Again, the coeffi- 
cient on the term for subsequent U.S. interven- 
tion is not statistically significant. 
An  inspection of day-to-day events surround- 
ing the G5 period, however, suggests some pos- 
sible amendments to the results of the regres- 
sion analysis. As figure 3 indicates, the dollar fell 
sharply relative to the mark ind  yen between 
September 22 and October 4. This decline seems 
related to the G5 intervention. 
If, however, we split the dummy variables for 
subsequent intervention into periods before and 
after October 4, the results are not altered (see 
table 2B). The coefficients for subsequent inter- 
vention before October 4 are not significantly 
different from zero at acceptable confidence 
intervals. The G5 announcement could have 
produced this sharp decline in both the mark- 
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Best available copyI.  Estimation Period: August 23, 1985 to December 9, 1985 
A.  Dependent Variable: mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (1)  -0.052  -6.420 
Subsequent purchases 
before/on  10/4  (3)  0.004  0.837 
Subsequent purchases 
after 10/4  (10)  0.001  0.517 
Lagged dependent  0.999  998.0a 
Sum of Squared Residuals =  0.00426 
RZ = 0.970 
n  = 75 
B.  Dependent Variable: yen-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (2)  0.027  -4.964a 
Subsequent purchases 
before/on  10/4  (5)  -0.001  -0.290 
Subsequent purchases 
after 10/4  (12)  0.0001  0.054 
Iagged dependent  0.999  5238.da 
Sum of Squared Residuals =  0.00421 
R2  =  0.897 
n  =  75 
NOTE:  Intervention refers to U.S. purchases or sales of foreign currencies. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times the dummy equals 1. 
a.  Significant at the 1%  confidence level. 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates prior to 
October 4, but the day-to-day movements in 
these exchange rates are not correlated with 
subsequent U.S. intervention before October 4. It 
is not clear that subsequent intervention prior to 
October 4 reinforced any announcement effect. 
Thus, the G5 intervention seems to have been 
partially successful in producing a downward 
shift in the dollar.13 It appears that intervention 
a  13  Feldstein (1986) considers G5 intervention using similar regression 
techniques and using models that employ a time trend, "shift" dummies, and 
"slope" dummies. He finds evidence of a shift effect, but no evidence of  a 
change in slope. 
had a strong announcement effect on both the 
mark-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates, which 
could have lasted through early October. Day-to- 
day movements in the dollar, however, were not 
correlated with day-to-day intervention. After 
October 4, intervention did not seem to contrib- 
ute to the dollar's depreciation. 
A number of events may explain this result. 
The G5 communique, which the U.S. reportedly 
initiated, seemed to have a major effect on 
market expectations. It appeared to represent a 
major departure from the previous U.S. position 
on intervention and a change in the administra- 
tion's attitude toward a strong dollar. Previous 
official discussions of intervention typically indi- 
cated that operational goals were "to counter 
disorderly market conditions" or to prevent dis- 
ruptive speculation. The communique now sug- 
gested that exchange rates were not correctly 
reflecting market developments: 
"Ministers and Governors were of 
the view that recent shifts in funda- 
mental economic conditions among 
their countries, together with policy 
commitments for the future, have not 
been reflected fully in exchange 
markets."14 
In addition, the G5 agreement seemed to 
eliminate any possibility that the Federal Reserve 
would tighten monetary policy in the near term, 
even though the aggregates were growing well 
above target. The communique indicated that 
the United States would take steps to reduce its 
federal budget deficit and that West Germany 
and Japan would adopt policies to stimulate 
their economies. 
The intervention operations following the G5 
agreement were large and highly visible. The de- 
gree of cooperation among West Germany,  Japan, 
and the United States was greater than in the 
previous intervention episodes. In addition, the 
intervention was "leaning with the wind"; the 
dollar already had been depreciating, and market 
fundamentals generally favored a depreciation. 
The effects of intervention began to wear off 
by early October, however, because policymak- 
ers in the G5 countries were no longer reinforc- 
ing or substantiating expectations of additional 
policy initiatives to drive the dollar lower. The 
dollar actually appreciated 3 percent against the 
mark between October 4 and October 16. The 
market, which anticipated additional policy initi- 
atives on the part of the G5 countries at the 
International Monetary Fund/International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development meetings 
w 14  See "Daily Report  for Executives,  No.  185." Washington, D.C.:  The 
Bweau of National Affairs (September 24, 1985):  M-1. 
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Best available copyin Seoul, Korea, began to lose confidence that 
the G5 countries would take additional steps to 
encourage the dollar's depreciation when the 
meeting focused on the international-debt situa- 
tion. Moreover, Bundesbank President Karl Otto 
Poehl expressed satisfaction with the extent of 
the dollar depreciation to date. 
Monetary policies in the United States and in 
West Germany did not seem to support interven- 
tion, and central-bank officials did not actively 
promote the policy. The recently released August 
1985 FOMC minutes indicated that the Federal 
Reserve Board did not want to supply additional 
reserves to the banking system, because the 
aggregates were well above the upper-target 
bound. Equally influential, the minutes expressed 
Chairman Volcker's concern about the speed of 
the dollar's depreciation.15 By  early November, 
central banks in both the United States and West 
Germany were busy denying the existence of 
any agreement to encourage a dollar deprecia- 
tion by manipulating international interest-rate 
spreads (Cross, Winter 1985-86,  p. 47). 
The situation relative to the Japanese yen was 
similar. The yen gave up approximately 1 per- 
cent of its gains against the dollar between 
October 4 and October 7. Thereafter, through 
November 24, the yen-dollar exchange rate 
remained little changed. The slight difference 
between this rate and the mark-dollar exchange 
rate might have resulted because the Japanese 
monetary authorities were not as quick as their 
West German counterparts to disavow their cur- 
rency's appreciation. Officials at the Bank of 
Japan and at the  Japanese Finance Ministry had 
announced on October 15 additional policy 
changes to encourage a yen appreciation. 
Moreover, yen interest rates rose, especially 
short-term interest rates. 
By  late November, West Germany,  Japan, and 
the United States had ceased intervention. The 
yen continued to appreciate against the dollar, as 
interest rates on yen-denominated assets rose 
relative to interest rates on dollar-denominated 
assets. The mark appreciation quickened 
because it now seemed out of line compared to 
the yen. Nominal interest rates in West Germany 
tended to firm, supporting a mark appreciation. 
In December 1985, the yen-dollar rate fell below 
Y200, and the mark-dollar rate broke DM  2.5. 
The dollar depreciated on balance in a rela- 
tively orderly manner against all major currencies 
throughout 1986. The depreciation seemed con- 
sistent with the continuing worldwide trade 
15  See  Board of  Governors of  the  Federal Resewe System, Annual 
Report 1985, p.  119. 
imbalances and with general trends in interest- 
rate differentials.  The United States did not inter- 
vene in 1986. 
Group of  Seven 
Intervention: 
February 1987 
to  August  1987 
Throughout 1987, the nominal U.S. current- 
account deficit continued to grow, but private 
foreigners were becoming increasingly reluctant 
to finance the current-account deficit.16 The dol- 
lar continued to depreciate, but at a more modest 
pace, and interest-rate spreads widened to attract 
private capital. Money growth in the United 
States began to slow relative to money growth in 
West Germany and Japan as concerns about 
inflation increased. 
West Germany and Japan became increasingly 
hesitant to stimulate their economies or to 
encourage further dollar depreciation. Both coun- 
tries were experiencing money growth above 
target levels, and both began to see an increase 
in consumer prices, which had been falling. 
In January 1987, the dollar came under heavy 
selling pressure and contributed to a realignment 
of the central rates in the European Monetary Sys- 
tem (EMS). Despite the problems in the EMS, 
much of the dollar's movement in January oc- 
curred in relation to the Japanese yen. This 
prompted heavy Japanese intervention, and on 
January 28, the United States intervened in a 
"hectic and nervous" market, selling a small 
amount of yen (Cross, Spring 1987a). This inter- 
vention followed statements reaffirming coopera- 
tion among the major central banks and was fol- 
lowed by a 1.2 percent appreciation of the dollar 
relative to the yen. The appreciation was not 
offset in the day immediately following interven- 
tion; the yen remained relatively stable through 
mid-March. 
The dollar seemed to stabilize in February, fol- 
lowing the release of favorable trade data late in 
January. Over the weekend of February 20, the G7 
16  Private foreign investors acquired $20.6  billion in marketable Treasury 
securities in 1985, but acquired only $6.8 billion in 1986.  During the first half of 
1987, private foreign investors reduced their holdings of marketable Treasury 
securities by $1.3  billion. The  data also indicate that increased official pur- 
chases offset much of  the reduction in private foreign holdings of  marketable 
U.S. Treasury securities. Official acquisitions of  marketable U.S. Treasury 
securities increased from $8.1 billion in 1985,  to $14.4 billion in 1986,  to $18.7 
billion during the first half of 1987.  See Federal Rese~e  Bulletin, October 1987, 
p. A66.  Lcupesko and Johnson (1987) discuss these data. 
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Best available copyI.  Estimation Period:  February 23, 1987 to  July 2, 1987 
A.  Dependent Variable:  mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (1)  -0.007  -1.258 
Subsequent purchases  (0)  -  - 
Initial sales  (3)  -0.006  -1.911" 
Subsequent sales  (2)  -0.008  1.468 
Lagged dependent  1.001  985.3' 
Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.0027 
R2  =  0.796 
n  =  90 
B.  Dependent Variable: yen-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent purchases  (0)  -  - 
Initial sales  (2)  -0.008  -1.207 
Subsequent sales  (16)  -0.003  -2.115" 
Lagged dependent  1.000  0.766' 
Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.0034 
R2  =  0.9636 
n  =  90 
NOTE:  Intervention refers to U.S. purchases or sales of foreign currencies. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times the dummy equals 1 
a. Significant at the 10% confidence level. 
b.  Significant at the 1% confidence level (two-tailed). 
c.  Significant at the 5% confidence level (two-tailed). 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
countries met in Paris. The resulting communi- 
que, the Louvre agreement, suggested that the 
participants had agreed informally to a set of ref- 
erence zones for the yen-dollar and mark-dollar 
exchange rates. The market's belief that the G7 
countries had adopted a set of reference zones 
for the major exchange rates seems to have re- 
duced perceptions of exchange risk and seems to 
have increased demand for currencies with rela- 
tively high interest rates, including the dollar.17 
17  Fw a discussion  of  these events, see  Cross  (Spring  1987b) 
Following the Paris meeting, the volume of 
foreign central-bank intervention increased and 
reinforced the market's belief in reference zones. 
The United States intervened on March 11, buy- 
ing $30 million equivalent of West German 
marks as the dollar temporarily rose above 1.85 
marks per dollar (Cross, Spring 198713, p. 59). 
Less than two weeks later, the United States 
began to intervene frequently and very heavily in 
the foreign-exchange markets, as the dollar 
depreciated below 150 yen on fears of a trade 
war between the United States and Japan. 
Between March 23 and April 6, the United States 
sold $3 billion equivalent in yen, and foreign 
central banks bought an "extraordinary" amount 
of dollars (Cross, Spring 1987b, p. 62). Interven- 
tion continued intermittently throughout May 
and in early June, with the United States selling a 
small amount of yen ($123 million equivalent) 
and a relatively moderate amount of marks ($680 
million equivalent) (Cross, Autumn 1987). 
We estimated our regression over the period 
late February through early July (see table 3). For 
the West German mark, the regression coeffi- 
cient on the dummy variable for initial purchases 
of marks was not statistically significant. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable for initial sales 
of marks was statistically different from zero, but 
its negative sign indicates that the dollar depre- 
ciated, on average, after the sales of marks. If 
intervention stabilized the exchange rate, one 
would expect a positive sign on coefficients 
associated with sales of foreign currencies for 
dollars. The coefficient for subsequent mark 
sales was not significantly different from zero. 
For the Japanese yen, the coefficient on initial 
intervention was not significantly different from 
zero at standard confidence levels. The coeffi- 
cient on subsequent intervention was significant 
at the 5 percent confidence range, but the sign 
of the coefficient was negative. This indicates 
that the depreciation of the dollar was larger, on 
average, on the days following subsequent inter- 
vention against the yen. 
As in the G5 episode, the major central banks 
closely coordinated their intervention efforts dur- 
ing this period. Intervention also was highly visi- 
ble; at various times, Chairman Volcker, Vice- 
Chairman Martin and U.S. Treasury  Secretary  Baker 
acknowledged that intervention was under way. 
Unlike the G5 episode, however, the central 
banks were leaning against the wind instead of 
with it. During March and April, the G7 indicated 
no changes in monetary or fiscal policies that 
might have altered the fundamentals in the 
exchange market. Moreover, a clear signal about 
the administration's views on the dollar's depre- 
ciation did not emerge. Treasury Secretary Baker 
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States did not wish to see a further depreciation 
of the dollar, but U.S. trade representative Yeuter 
appeared to contradict this statement. Conse- 
quently, intervention did not appear to have an 
effect on the dollar's exchange rate. The dollar 
continued to depreciate against the yen at a 
rapid pace through April (see figure 4). 
March  April  May  June 
1987 
SOURCES:  Bank  of  America,  DRI-FACS;  and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland. 
II 
At  the end of April, Chairman Volcker 
indicated that the Federal Reserve System was 
"snugging" monetary policy, and Japanese Prime 
Minister Nakasone indicated that Japan would 
ease monetaly policy. In May, the West German 
Bundesbank lowered some of its official money 
market rates. The dollar firmed on the belief that 
these changes in monetary policy would pro- 
mote wider interest-rate spreads that favored 
dollar-denominated assets. In late May, the Japa- 
nese announced a sizable fiscal package 
designed to stimulate their economy and help 
reduce their trade surplus. 
The United States intervened in May and June 
to counter the impact on the dollar of specific 
events, such as the announcement in May that 
money-center banks were adding loan-loss 
reserves against their outstanding developing- 
country loans, and the announcement in June 
that Chairman Volcker would not seek an addi- 
tional term (Cross, Autumn 1987). Intervention 
may have affected the dollar in the former 
instance, but not in the latter. In any case, the 
effects of these announcements on the dollar 
were short-lived. 
The dollar continued to firm until early August. 
Then, as the dollar rose above 1.85 marks, the 
United States intervened against marks. The Unit- 
ed States sold $631 million against marks between 
August 4 and August 10 (Cross, Winter 1987-88, 
p. 48). By  mid-August, following the release of 
merchandise trade data showing an unexpect- 
edly large deficit for June, the dollar began 
depreciating again. The United States undertook 
intervention purchases of dollars against yen late 
in August, buying $389.5 million against yen 
between August 24 and September 2.l8 
U.S. intervention in August had no obvious in- 
fluence on the dollar; neither the coefficients for 
initial intervention nor the coefficients for sub- 
sequent intervention in the mark-dollar and yen- 
dollar equations were significantly different from 
zero at acceptable confidence levels (see table 4). 
The market did not seem to  associate this interven- 
tion with any change in U.S. or foreign policies. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Between August 1984 and August 1987, the dol- 
lar depreciated sharply in response to a large 
and persistent current-account deficit and to 
changes in other market fundamentals, especially 
long-term interest-rate differentials. During this 
period, central-bank intervention also increased 
dramatically. We have identified three U.S. inter- 
vention regimes over this period, each of which 
is distinct in terms of the direction of interven- 
tion, the size and duration of intervention, the 
degree of visibility, or the extent of central-bank 
cooperation. The response of the exchange rate 
to intervention was not uniform over this period, 
but a pattern seems to emerge. 
Generally, this study suggests that intervention 
can have a temporary announcement effect on 
the exchange rate. This announcement effect, 
however, is not universal. Between August 1984 
and August 1987, it was associated with initial 
interventions that were highly visible or that 
were coordinated with visible foreign interven- 
tion. This was the case in September 1984, when 
U.S. intervention accompanied a highly visible 
West German intervention, and in February 1985, 
when Chairman Volcker's comments about 
intervention and a highly visible West German 
transaction preceded US, intervention. 
18  Our sample period ends on August  28, 1987. 
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Best available copyI.  Estimation Period: July 5, 1987 to August 28, 1987 
A.  Dependent Variable:  mark-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (1)  -0.002  -0.344 
Subsequent purchases  (3)  0.003  1.031 
Initial sales  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent sales  (0)  -  - 
Lagged dependent  0.9994  728.9" 
Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.0009 
R2  = 0.808 
n  =  38 
B.  Dependent Variable: yen-dollar exchange rate 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intervention dummies 
Initial purchases  (0)  -  - 
Subsequent purchases  (0)  -  - 
Initial sales  (1)  -0.0093  1.186 
Subsequent sales  (0)  -  - 
Lagged dependent  0.9999  3941.1" 
Sum of Squared Residuals =  0.00215 
R2  =  0.794 
n  =  38 
NOTE:  Intervention refers to U.S. purchases or sales of foreign currencies. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of  times the dummy equals 1. 
a. Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
The size and duration of any announcement 
effect seems greater when the market associates 
intervention with a change in monetary and fiscal 
policies. The biggest impact occurred during the 
G5 episode, when the market thought that the 
G5 countries would undertake more substantial 
monetary and fiscal policies to lower the 
exchange value of the dollar and reduce their 
trade imbalances. 
An announcement effect is more likely to occur 
if  market fundamentals are moving or just begin- 
ning to move in a manner consistent with the 
thrust of intervention. No apparent announce- 
ment effect was associated with intervention in 
1987, when the United States attempted to lean 
against the wind. The dollar stabilized only after 
US., West German, and Japanese policymakers 
indicated changes in monetary policies that pos- 
sibly could alter the direction of the wind. 
In nearly all cases, the duration of any 
announcement effect is short, generally lasting 
only one day. An exception might be the G5 epi- 
sode, when the market seemed to expect major 
policy changes; hence the dollar depreciated 
from September 20 through October 4, 1985. 
Nevertheless, our data show that subsequent 
intervention prior to October 4 was not related 
to day-to-day exchange-rate movements. 
Beyond this temporary announcement effect, 
however, U.S. intervention had no apparent 
impact on the exchange value of the dollar. In 
nearly all instances, subsequent intervention did 
not appear to influence exchange rates. In the 
one exception, the G7 period, the coefficient did 
not have the expected sign. The dollar's depreci- 
ation during the period might have been much 
sharper in the absence of intervention, but this 
hypothesis is not testable. 
Our results are consistent with previous empir- 
ical investigations of intervention, which find little 
support for a systematic exchange-rate response to 
intervention.19  Our results for the G5 period also 
seem to agree with Feldstein (1986), who found 
that G5 intervention resulted in a one-time shift 
in exchange rates, but not a shift in the slope of 
the exchange-rate path. This seems consist en^ 
with the view that sterilized intervention oper- 
ates through an expectations channel. 
Finally, we find some support for the view that 
coordinated intervention is more effective than 
uncoordinated intervention. Loopesko (  1983) 
found mixed results when testing the importance 
of coordination, but Greene (1984a) suggests 
that coordination increases the effectiveness of 
intervention. 
Our conclusions about intervention also are 
consistent-in direction, if not in degree-with 
many of the official views expressed in the Jur- 
gensen Report (  1983). These views undoubtedly 
reflect the opinions and experiences of  individ- 
uals who conduct intervention for major indus- 
trial countries. The Jurgensen Report indicates 
that intervention does not have a lasting effect 
on exchange rates, especially when the thrust of 
intervention is inconsistent with market funda- 
mentals. Our failure to find a correlation between 
subsequent intervention and exchange-rate move- 
ments, or any correctly signed correlation during 
the G7 period, is consistent with this view. The 




Best available copyJurgensen Report does maintain that intervention 
can have a temporary effect and suggests that this 
effect works primarily through an expectations 
channel. Our results tend to verify this view, but 
indicate that the times when intervention can 
have a temporary impact seem rare and depend 
on expectations about other policy developments. 
The policy implications of these results are 
not substantially different from those found in 
the Jurgensen Report. First, exchange-market 
intervention does not afford countries an addi- 
tional policy lever with which to influence 
exchange rates over the long term, independent 
of  monetary and fiscal policies. Second, frequent 
or otherwise systematic intervention that does 
not provide new information to the market will 
not affect exchange rates. The size and duration 
of any announcement effect seems to depend on 
the extent to which the intervention creates 
expectations of changes in monetary and fiscal 
policies. Because this announcement effect has a 
very short duration, monetary authorities must 
reinforce intervention quickly with other policy 
initiatives. Third, beyond possible announce- 
ment effect, exchange-market intervention has 
no apparent influence on day-to-day exchange- 
rate movements. 
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